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THE MAOIST MOVEMENT AND
THE INDIAN STATE: MEDIATING PEACE
G. Haragopal*

This note is an account of the mediation/ negotiation at two separate
kidnapping inddents- in Gurtendu in Andhra Pradesh in 1987 and
in Ma/kangiri in Orisa in February 2011 (in which the author was
personaljy involved). It examines the reiponse of the State, the ensuing
peace talks and anajlyes whether any democratic spaces were opened up
consequently.
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BRIEF BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT

1. The Origin of the Movement
The Naxalite Movement started out as an outburst against an exploitative
system which has remained almost unchanged since independence. It marked the
beginning of militant politics as a solution to the age old problems that continue
to plague rural India, especially the tribal areas. The struggle started against the
local landlords and moneylenders at Naxalbari village in West Bengal in 1967, and
what was described by the then Darjeeling superintendent of police as "mosquito
menace" is today described by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as "the greatest
internal security threat".
This metamorphosis needs to be analyzed and looked at in the backdrop of
the changing contours of the movement and its encounter with the Indian State.
While the Indian State is determined to put down the Naxalite Movement by all
means, the latter looks equally determined to overthrow the State through armed
struggle. Neither possibility, however, exists at this juncture. The confrontation
has lasted for more than four decades and the Indian State has failed to contain
it. On the contrary, the movement has spread to more areas. Yet, the might of the
State is so formidable that its overthrow is not likely to be an easy proposition in
the near future. This fact of protracted struggle is even admitted by the Naxalite
Movement itself In a historical situation of this kind, there is bound to be a
variety of experiences and experiments which provide a clue to comprehend the
complexities of the phenomenon.
The Naxalite Movement that started in West Bengal soon found its echo
in the tribal areas of Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh and spread to the plains of
the Karimnagar district of Northern Telengana of the State. The movement, in
the late sixties to the mid-eighties, with Charu Mujamdar as its first ideologue,
was primarily directed against the landlords and moneylenders, being premised
on the philosophy of annihilation of class enemies. However, serious ideological
differences within the movement soon resulted in splits and counter-splits, with the
1

Rahi Gaikwad, Ianmohan:Naxalismthe GreatestInternalThreat,THE HINDU, October 11, 2009,
available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article32290.ece?service=mobile.
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Peoples War, which later became the Maoist Party, emerging as the most influential
of all factions. Although all factions believed in a protracted armed struggle
against the State, they differed in their approaches, methods and understanding
of the complex socio-political formations and conditions on ground. Thus, while
the leader of each ideological faction was a name of repute and sacrifice, it was
Kondapally Seetaramaiah who proved to be a far better organizer and strategist,
which is evidenced by the fact that his party [Communist Party of India (MarxistLeninist) People's War, generally referred to as People's War Group] survived
longer and spread the farthest, to the extent that its very existence is considered
to be one of the greatest threats facing modern India.
The Naxalite Movement pushed several questions to the forefront of the
national agenda. These related to the nature of the State, the modes of production
and strategies of change. The movement, emerging as a response to deep sociopolitical crisis in the various parts of the country, was born out of a belief that
there were no political options open to the people except organized and violent
struggle. The political response, both at the central and state level, displayed
an ambivalent attitude which ranged from terming the Naxalite Movement as
addressing socio-economic concerns, to treating it as a law and order question.2

2. The Politics of the State's Response
Nevertheless, the mid-eighties witnessed a change of stance of the police and
the home ministry: heralded by the tenure of Vengal Rao as the Chief Minister
of Andhra Pradesh in the 1970s, the police and the home ministry became more
aggressive and started adopting a hard line stance against the Naxalite Movement,
believing that the Naxals should not be given due protection under the rule of
law and the Indian Constitution. This period was thus characterized by many
cases of fake encounters, custodial deaths, disappearance of party activists and
2

The Congress Ministers, including the Chief Ministers, went on record to state that the
Naxalite "problem" was not a law and order problem. The former Prime Minister, P V
Narsimha Rao, in a personal discussion with the author, forcefully argued that the Naxalite
problem was a socio-economic problem (This was, of course, before he assumed the role of
Prime Minister). There are others as per the experience of the author, particularly the home
ministers, under the guidance of the police in Andhra Pradesh who have been consistently
taking an exclusively law and order view of the issue.
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sympathizers, attacks and raids on villages and the killing of countless civil liberties
activists. It was this lawlessness propagated, or at least unchecked by the State,
that qualitatively changed the political context and the character of the Naxalite
Movement.
It has been the tragedy of India's feeble democratic system that the question
of the lawlessness of the State failed to create or sustain healthy public pressure
and debate, with a large section of the educated middle-classes believing that the
State should be empowered beyond questionable limits. Encouraged by such a
disposition of the otherwise articulate class and the indifference of the society in
general, the State became even more repressive. It was this lawlessness, coupled
with an absence of socio-economic measures to improve the conditions of the
marginalized and dispossessed, which had a multiplier effect on the deteriorating
conditions in society.
Another contributing factor is the way in which the police force lets loose its
violence on political movements such as those of the Naxalites in the name of
"law and order", while not tackling other forms of violence in a similar fashion.
For instance, the violence that parliamentary factionalism or communal riots
trigger is not handled in such a callous manner, and is in fact often backed by
State-protection, if not State-participation; a case in point is the Godhra riots.'
Even the violence perpetrated against the marginalized, dispossessed and the
disadvantaged in the name of parliamentary politics goes totally unchecked. The
law in such cases is rendered totally ineffective, and as it becomes increasingly
ineffective, it is substituted by the lawless brute power. In such a situation, men
who wield the guns become the crucial decision-makers. Such a situation is
regressive, not only because it neutralizes the control of the civil bureaucracy,
the political elite, the elected representatives and the judicial process, but more
so because these controls were a product of the advancement of civilizations
which endeavoured to regulate the (threat of) use of physical force, particularly
the brutality and arbitrariness associated with it.

3

The Godhra riots are the most striking, tragic and ghastly experience that the nation has witnessed.
In the riots, one did not hear of reports of either encounter deaths or use of brutal state force
against the majority Hindus. However, it should be noted that this point is made only to highlight
the contrast in State (in)action and does not constitute an endorsement of any kind.
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The contradictory approaches of the State to violence' are reflective of the
premium paid to different problems of the society and the differing approaches
to each of these problems. Thus, while those who are responsible for, say the
Bhopal Gas tragedy or the Gujarat riots or financial offences get state protection,
the poor are subjected to the most inhuman and brutal torture, an alternative
worse than the prevailing apathy. This difference in approach indicates that what
the State or the police is opposed to is not violence per se, but a particulartype of
violence; the violence which is associated with alternative politics. The Naxalite
Movement has been raising and fighting for issues related to land, water, forest
rights, livelihood, minimum wages, dignity and self-reliance; issues which do not
fall outside Part IV of the Indian Constitution relating to Directive Principles of
State Policy, or for that matter, even the manifestos of different parliamentary
political groups. However, the Naxalites are far more serious in their approach
to these issues. Therefore, even though there has been severe criticism of their
methods, this does not extend to criticism of their goals. Instead of taking their
own political promises with greater seriousness, ruling parties depend on brute
physical force to tackle and silence serious political questions. This is the political
tragedy of our times.
The shift to greater dependence on physical force is becoming increasingly
evident now. During the last two decades, especially after the introduction of
the New Economic Policy, the manoeuvrability that the State earlier enjoyed is
almost lost and this could be one of the reasons for banning the People's War
[now the Communist Party of India (Maoist), generally referred to as Maoist
Party]. Furthermore, this shift has resulted in conceding greater arbitrary powers
to the police apparatus. It is believed that the successive Chief Ministers in their
confidential meetings with police officers have been pledging their total and
unconditional support to approving all the arbitrary and ruthless actions that the
police "initiate" to "contain" the Naxalite challenge.' Such a political culture has
resulted in the police force becoming extremely powerful, especially in certain
domains, with the political system unable to retain any effective control over it.
4
5

The violence here refers to violence by the Naxals in contrast with violence associated with
participatory/ electoral/ communal politics.
This information has been communicated to the author by many sources.
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The police are also simultaneously being used for personal and partisan ends. In
this context, political control and political interference need to be differentiated.
In the normal logic of the cabinet system of government, the home minister is
in charge of controlling the police. However, in translation to practice, the home
ministers have been reduced to public relations officers of the police department.
While they exercise control and even interfere with their functioning when it is
in line with their own political interests, when it comes to the problems of the
masses, these ministers allow the police to suppress every democratic demand that
people make. The resulting situation has rendered political control, considered to
be amongst the major advancements in the wake of liberalism and constitutional
governance, ineffective, if not completely irrelevant. The politicians and the police
together are responsible for this degeneration.
As the political system has largely come to depend on the police to tackle
certain serious political questions such as the Naxalite problem (which in turn has
been fostered by the serious development issues in tribal regions), the police has
increasingly started occupying political space. The earlier buffers that the political
and legal systems provided and are expected to provide, such as the rule of law,
due process and democratic discussions, are no longer available. Consequently,
the Naxalite Movement is subjected to greater repression. The Naxalites in turn
have subjected the MLAs, MPs, Ministers, Mandal Presidents and Sarpanches
to pressure, in order to contain the arbitrary police violence. A political system
which has given up its political role and has withdrawn from the public sphere
is in no position to handle the situation. In fact, its inability is demonstrated by
the fact that several public representatives have moved to the towns, particularly
to the capital city, Hyderabad, which they consider safer, and those who have
stayed back in the more backward or tribal regions have been provided with
armed bodyguards. This protection by armed guards has been extended to several
categories of persons, including the Vice-Chancellors. It is worth recalling that
immediately after independence when Gandhi was offered police protection,
he declined. Gandhi perhaps, paid a price for it. But he was willing to pay that
price as part of his public duty.' Now every big and small leader is provided with
6

Gandhi addressing the Banaras Hindu University students observed, "While the viceroy
was going through the streets of Banaras there were detectives stationed in many places.
We asked ourselves why this distrust? Is it not that even Lord Holdings should die than live
a living death?" Lecture of Gandhi at Banares Hindu University, Banares, Feb, 1916. See
Rudrangshu ]Mukherjee, THE GREAT SPEECHES OF MIODERN INDI\ (2001).
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bodyguards. In fact, the institution of bodyguards has come to represent the
dividing line between important and "unimportant" persons and positions.
As the police have assumed the responsibility of containing the Naxalite
Movement and protecting the lives of the political representatives, the
conventional role of the politician as a legitimiser of power is no longer valid.
In the process of violence and counter-violence, there has been a loss of life on
both sides. The scale and level of violence has been rapidly rising. In the recent
past, Naxalites have lost some of their important leaders and the police have lost
their own personnel such as senior IPS officers, including those officers of the
DIG (Deputy Inspector General) rank.
3. Background and Aim of the Paper
The People's War that carried the struggle against the landlords and local
exploiters seems to have changed its strategy from the mid-eighties onwards, by
deciding to directly hit out at the State, particularly the police. This began with
the killing of a sub-inspector in Warangal, which in turn led to the killing of
an unarmed civil liberties leader, Dr. Ramanatham, in "retaliation". It is in this
changing context that the kidnapping of civilian officers has become a method of
resistance in confronting the State. This method, which came to be used in 1986,
continued till 1993 in Andhra Pradesh and after a gap of almost two decades,
was repeated in Orissa. In these two and half decades, the pattern, the process
and the demands of the Naxalites underwent a change, but the striking aspect of
the entire episode is the response of the State, which for the first time, employed
means other than naked violence. The Naxalite movements on their part, put
forward certain demands and agreed to negotiate with a State, in which they
claimed they had no faith or belief This whole process is striking because there
was no physical violence from either side, both of whom believed in mediation as
a method of resolving the issues. It is this space that is construed as "democratic
space" in this paper.
This paper is essentially an attempt to look at two separate incidents of
kidnapping - in Gurtedu in Andhra Pradesh and in Malkangiri in Orissa, in
addition to the peace talks held between the Maoist Party and Government of
Andhra Pradesh in the year 2004. The significance of the kidnaps and peace
119
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talks has been that there were attempts on both the sides to avert loss of human
life or avoid violence, if violence in its essential sense means loss of human life.
Analyzing the factors that contributed to this process and the democratic spaces
that opened up constitute the central concern of this paper.

II.

UNRAVELLING THE GURTEDU KIDNAP

1. The Kidnapping and Subsequent Negotiations
On December 27, 1987, the People's War dalam of East Godavari district in
Andhra Pradesh abducted seven IAS officers, including S.R. Sankaran (a legendary
civil servant)7 and demanded the release of eight of their comrades who were
lodged in Rajahmundry Jail, along with the return of the weapons which had been
seized by the police during the raid. Although this kidnapping was not the first,
it attracted national and international attention. In the same district in 1984, B.S.
Bishnu, a revenue divisional officer of Peddapuram was taken hostage. At that
time, their demand of the release of their comrade Perumal alias Nallanna, had
been readily conceded by the Government.
This method of confronting the State and putting the demands on the very
State which the movement seeks to overthrow raises new questions and issues.
The People's War in their official organ kranti observed that "any revolutionary
party, which is dedicated to overthrow[ing] the exploitative regime world [should]
strive to resist the fascist oppression unleashed by the Government at present.
It [must] follow self-defence policies to protect the victories of the peoples'
struggles."' They further added that,
'Tn the earjl days of the anti-feudalstrugglein northern Telangana, man jorms of struggle
like social boycott came to the fore to weaken the economic and social dominance of the
landlords and thereby make them tojield ... It is inevitable that new orms of struggles
emerge as the class struggle deepens. When a government which is relative)ly stronger in
it
military and organi.ationalspheres declaredan unjust war againstthe masses they .ght
out in their own possible methods. They discover new forms of struggle. Gurtedu incident
is one such nev jorm of struggle.'"
7

See G. Haragopal & S. R. Sankaran, A Humane PublicServant, Social Change, 41(1)

8
9

JOURNAL OF

FOR SoCiAL DEVELOPMENT (2011).
N. Venugopal cited it in his reply to Kancha Illaiah's comments, confusion over Gurthedu,
Calcutta. See FRONTIER, April 2, 1988.
Supra note 9.
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For the State which was well equipped with armed police and paramilitary
forces, used to dealing with resistance movements through coercive force, this
method of kidnapping as a form of resistance and putting in jeopardy the life
of their civilian officers was totally new. Any armed action by the State in such
a situation would result in loss of human life. This in turn would mean that the
State, which was mandated by the Constitution to protect the life and liberty
of its citizens, and was unable to protect its own officers', would have failed in
its primary responsibility. Such a result would not only demoralize the entire
civilian bureaucracy engaged in welfare and developmental activities, but also
erode the people's faith in the State. This becomes all the more crucial when
the abducted officers were men and women of integrity and committed to the
service of the marginalized sections. It is these dilemmas that unfolded in the
Gurtedu kidnapping.
The seven IAS officers, in fact, had gone to the tribal areas to discuss the
progress of tribal welfare programmes and had been without police protection
when they were abducted. Having been caught unawares by such an unexpected
development, the State was in a "crisis" of a different kind. In the whole process,
however, S.R. Sankaran, an IAS officer who kept track of the Naxalite Movement,
its ideological positions and its methods of resistance, perhaps came to recognize
the existence of a "democratic space". He thus pleaded with the dalam to set one
of them free to negotiate on their demands. The dalam agreed to this suggestion
and let Pushpa Thampi, the only woman IAS officer amongst the seven hostages
and T. Radha, the joint collector of East Godavari go for this task. Sankaran then
briefed the officers to contact only Yugandhar, the then Secretary of Industries and
a close confidant of his and K.G. Kannabiran, the then President of the Andhra
Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee [hereinafter,the "APCLC"], and no-one else.1
Yugandhar, a popular civil servant of the All India Services, was known for
his good work in Srikalulam (primarily a tribal district) as a district collector and
was equally well acquainted with the politics of the People's War. He enjoyed
considerable goodwill in administrative and political circles and consequently,
he briefed Nandamuri Taraka Rama Rao (more popularly known as NTR), the
10

This was told to the author by Sankaran himself
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then Chief Minister, that the only way to resolve the crisis was to involve the
civil liberties leader K.G. Kannabiran in the negotiations. NTR agreed to this
suggestion" and Yugandhar then approached Kannabiran, who, being appreciative
of the work of S.R. Sankaran and other IAS officers, was inclined to intervene.
Kannabiran later observed that "these officers were knownfortheirunremittingefjirts
to translateinto rea/itypoliciesand legislation regardingtibas." He further complimented
Sankaran, noting that "I knew personally Mr.Sankaranas an officer dedicatedto the cause
of the weaker sections ... a rare off icer who had $purredallperquisites andfanfare attached
to the office."1 2 However, another factor playing on his mind was his concern not
only about the officers, "but also the villagers who I feared would be subjected
to heavy repression."13 In spite of this personal appreciation for the work of the
officers, Kannabiran insisted on an official endorsement for his intervention.
As a civil liberties leader, he was deeply suspicious of the intentions of the
State, which he always believed was Kautilyan. Yugandhar subsequently took
the requisite official permission and convinced Kannabiran not to insist on such
technicalities nor have any apprehensions on that count.14 It is this context that
took Kannabiran to Gurtedu.
As Yugandhar and Kannabiran reached Rajahmundry, the police officers
camped there assured them that no police force would be used and that they
would extend all help in the smooth solving of the problem. This restraint on
the part of the police (who mostly used brutal methods) was something unusual.
The modalities that were agreed to were that Yugandhar and Kannabiran would
take charge of the prisoners while the police would be stationed nearby. However,
they would not be present at the spot where the eight Naxalite prisoners would
be handed over to the dalam in exchange for the IAS officers. The police told
Kannabiran to verify whether the names sent by the dalam tallied with the persons
in lockup. Kannabiran went to the police lockup and spoke to the prisoners,
only to find that one name was duplicated. When he introduced himself, all of
11
12

13
14

NTR, being a film actor and having played mythological roles, had a grain of concern for
life and respect for honest officers.
K. G. Kannabiran, Commando action would have been disastrous,INDIAN ExPREss,January2,1988.
Supra note 13.
Supra note 13.
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them recognized him and said that they trusted him. Of the incident, one of the
observers notes that "it was Kannabiran's presence on the scene that made all
the difference. For the first time he found himself acceptable to both the parties
involved.""
At one point during the negotiations and handing over, All India Radio
announced that commandos were arriving for an armed operation to rescue the
IAS officers. This led to a terrible situation inside the forest where the officers
were being kept."6 The dalam got infuriated and almost decided to execute the
officers. They were terribly upset and Sankaran was worried, not very much about
his own life but for the life of the younger officers who were married and had
families to care for. That was the stage where he suggested that M.V.P.C. Sastry,
the District Collector of West Godavari and one of the hostages, would send a
clear message to the government not to resort to any commando action. Thus,
he asked that one of the officers be allowed to carry the written message, to
which the dalam members agreed. They permitted Nansing Rao, the Assistant
Collector, to carry the letter. However, since the State had already taken a policy
decision not to use force, the same was later announced on All India Radio, thus
easing the situation. That the State kept such options open is characteristic of
the intrinsically dualistic nature of the State.
The time of exchange was fixed at 11:00 a.m. on December 30, 1987.
The Naxalite prisoners were brought to Darlagadda by 4:15 p.m. and handed
over to K.G. Kannabitan. As they got into the vehicle to go with Kannabiran,
they were accompanied by a plain clothes policeman, and to this, the prisoners
took exception. They were pacified and the policeman was asked to go back to
Darlagadda. Finally, they reached Gurtedu at 8:15 p.m.; but the abducted officers
had still not been brought. At that point, Kannabiran told the police not to go
back on their promise, despite the delays in the process. Even the prisoners told
Kannabiran that if the exchange did not take place, they would go back to the
central prison. At about 9:30 p.m., two members of the dalam came and verified
the identity of the prisoners and asked Kannabiran and Yugandhar to accompany
15
16

Sudarsan, Gurtedu and After, FRoNIER,January 30,1988.
Sankaran, in a personal account of the incident, told the author that the People's War had
planned to execute the remaining IAS officers at one stage.
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them to receive the IAS officers who had been kept one furlong away. As the
officers were handed over, they left Darlagadda and the episode of the kidnapping
came to an end.
Observations made by Kannabiran, way back in 1987 while reflecting on
the whole episode, are as relevant, if not more, to the present day model of
development. He wrote that "[w]hat shocked me most throughout the journey
was the acute poverty in the tribal areas. The tribals were undernourished, in spite
of the excellent work of persons like Sankaran and Sastry."1 Questioning how
long such excellent officers would last in the system and how long they would
be allowed to do their work, his suggested solution was that "[i]f the industrial
use of forests is rationally regulated and afforestation schemes are implemented
sincerely it is possible to save the environment and also ensure a decent living
standard for the tribals.""

2. The Ensuing Debate
The intervention of Kannabiran, however, provoked a serious debate in
the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee- a debate which was to continue
for almost a decade. The controversy was essentially around the question of
state violence versus private violence. It is true that all over the world, civil
rights groups were formed when the State transgressed the limits of the law
or enacted laws which conferred arbitrary powers on the state machinery; the
APCLC was no exception to this rule. The kidnapping by People's War was
construed as private violence and the feeling was that the civil liberties leader
ought to have not intervened since it was against the very mandate of a civil
liberties organization. There was another reason for the debate. The civil right
organization included, apart from those who were exclusively interested in the
rights question, sympathizers of different Naxal groups that were active in the
state. These groups not only had ideological differences with each other, but also
serious confrontations bordering on physical attacks for territorial dominance, and
these differences were reflected even in the APCLC. Since this incident involved
17
18

Supra note 13.
Supra note 13.
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People's War, the sympathisers of the other groups, particularly theJanasakti, were
not happy. Yet the issues raised by them are of serious theoretical significance.
In a reply to the questions raised by two members of the APCLC, sympathetic
to the Janasakti group regarding Kannabiran's propriety to intervene in the
kidnapping incident, Kannabitan told them that he would offer his explanation
once the matter had been raised in the executive committee. Recounting the event
to his biographer, he observed:
'I am a lawyer and a lawyer in public life. People do come to me with varied requests and
demands, as I am available and accessible. When somebody asks me the question that
Sankaran has been abductedand what would you do? I cannot Say thatI am indiferent to
the situation. Is there such apossibility?I cannot tell them that I will convene the meetings
of our executive andthen reply to the question. The questionsaboutproprietycan, of course,
be raised in the executive and if the executive opines that what I have done is wrong, either
they have the power to drop me from the organijfationor I have the liberty to step down ...
When people approachme I have got to do something andal o believe that it wouldpromote
the cause of civil liberties organi.ations.1
This position of Kannabiran, who fought relentlessly in the courts and
outside the courts, is a testament to his moral strength. In the history of an
organization, perhaps it is this type of moral personality that breaks new grounds
in theory and practice. Similarly, Kannabiran's creative practice led to a fresh
conceptualisation of the role of the civil rights movement and enlarged the
democratic concerns and the democratic space.
Moving on from the response of the civil rights movement to that of the
State Executive, it is interesting to note the variance in the responses of the civilian
bureaucracy and the police to the incident of kidnapping, which was suggestive
of the growing gulf between the civilian bureaucracy and the armed wing of the
State. The police and a section of the press felt that the IAS officers should take
an escort whenever they visited a tribal or problematic area. For the IAS officers
in the field, however, not taking armed escorts was both a matter of faith and
crucial to garnering the confidence of the tribals, without which no policy on
19

N. VENuGoITv,, 24 Hours, KG Kannahirank Memoirs in
(2010).
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tribals could succeed. Interestingly, these arguments hold ground even today.20
Even during the days of the Telangana uprising, no IAS officer took an armed
escort and this attitude is best explained by the following statement by a senior
bureaucrat: "[i]f you insist on us taking armed escorts you might as well write
off the tribals". 2 1 Both Sankaran and Sastry talked about how they would rather
risk another abduction than take a police escort to tribal villages. As they argued,
the purpose of these meetings was to establish rapport with the tribals, which is
necessary for the success of the government's developmental effort; that objective
would be defeated if an armed guard were to stand next to the collector while a
discussion was going on. 22
Commenting on the Gurtedu incident and how the web of extremism embeds
itself within the rural community through the medium of fear and deterrence,
police officer Lokendra Sharma admitted that the kidnapping was a temporary
setback in the effort to root out extremists in the state. Nonetheless, he observed
that "the kidnapping will widen the gap between extremists and tribals [and] it
is tribal interests that suffer. ... Such incidents expose the desperation of the
extremists and the absence of a mass base."23
The Central Government adopted a similar stand and "strongly condemned"
the abduction, stating that it was totally unacceptable for government officials to
become victims of this kind of terrorism and warning all "terrorists and extremist
elements" in the country that such acts would be met with the strongest counter

measures. 24
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Kondapally Seetaramaiah in an interview, three months after the kidnapping,
said that the People's War used the method of kidnap to bring round the State
and clarified that that there was no categorical policy not to resort to kidnapping.
He also said that they would not hesitate to kidnap Rajiv Gandhi or any other
minister if they got the opportunity. What was most insightful about the interview,
however, was his remark about the difference in the approach which the People's
War would have adopted had they abducted the police, in which case perhaps, they
would have not spared their lives.2 5 At the same time he declared that kidnapping
was only a part of their tactics and not the strategy of the party, since it cannot
bring about a revolution. The State was militarily stronger and its power could not
be underestimated. However, the strength of the People's War lay, not with armed
forces, but in the support of the people. Despite being aware that Sankaran was
a good officer, they went ahead with the kidnapping because their primary cause
was confrontation with the State, and in such cases the good and the bad are not
the questions. In this case, Sankaran formed a part of the State and therefore,
the People's War cadre acted in broad conformity with the party policy, in spite
of no directions from above.
Justifying the actions of his people, he focused on the fact that the kidnappers
did not harm the officers or take away their lives, despite being in a position to do
so. Instead, they adopted a more appropriate route and got their demands fulfilled
without causing any harm to the civilian officers.2 Outlining the movement's
strategy further, Seetaramaiah said that even in the case of police officers being
abducted, the party gave a benefit of doubt to "reasonable" officers or "lower
level officers" who came from very poor families.
In an interview, a top People's War leader replied to a question on how
he justified the kidnapping of IAS officers like Sankaran and Sastry who were
committed to tribal upliftment by saying that "do you really think that we would
have killed the IAS hostages even if our prisoners were not released. No we would
have never done it."2
25
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had been a police officer, he would have been executed. To another question
on violence, the reply was "[o]urs is only counter-violence. When the landlords
continue their traditional exploitation and plunder the hapless tribals with the help
of their private armies and police officials, we counter it with people's violence.
It is reciprocal and a historical necessity." 2 8

3. Debates and Discussions on the Kidnapping
The progressive media carried a debate on the whole issue and there was
criticism and counter criticism, support and opposition, to kidnapping as a method
of resistance. The media's prescription for ridding the country of Naxalism
included a multi-prong strategy which involved first, strengthening the police
force and secondl, stepping up the tribal development programmes, especially
land reforms, to ensure that there was no longer a sub-stratum for the movement
to flourish.
Responding to the incident, the mainstream media expressed its displeasure
and even anger, with the Illustrated Weekly naming Kondappali Seetaramaiah
as the messiah of annihilation. It lamented about how the second half of 1987
was drenched with the blood of slain policemen, with the trigger being pulled
at each instance by members of the People's War Group reigniting symbols of
terror. The report concluded by observing that "the menace of the Naxalites
hangs in the air."29
In another report in 1988, the Illustrated Weekly reported "that the
thunder of Naxalbari resonated with angry fury when Naxalites kidnapped
seven IAS officers".

It went on to criticise the Andhra model by noting that

while the revolutionaries in West Bengal and Kerala had renounced the path
of annihilation and accepted the Westminster model, their contemporaries in
Andhra had continued to wage a lonely and bloody war against the State, which
in turn had triggered off harsh governmental retaliation. Describing the Naxalites
simultaneously as "brutal, ruthless, nihilists" who lived in a tableau of blood
and terror, fear and revolution and who as "the armed zealots of Kondapally
28
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Seetaramaiah ringed a bevy of defenceless government officials", it captured how
they had struck at the soft underbelly of the system.3 1 The report went on to
opine that it thought that the Naxalite Movement in the recent months (in 1987)
had begun to lose its ideological veneer and was sliding rapidly into a pattern of
senseless killing and rampant terror that belied any claim to social commitment.
Similar reports could be seen in the Western world as well.32
Economic and Political Weekly in its columns published a brief note on the
kidnapping3 which evoked a series of questions and debate. The note disagreed
with the comments of the mainstream media (calling it the "bourgeois press" for
out-rightly condemning the movement and terming it "terrorist" 4 ) and said that
is was "rushing to judgment." The note observed that "instead of condemning
and branding them as murderers, bandits and desperadoes, a more reasonable
approach would be to view it in the perspective of the praxis of a revolutionary
group with reportedly well-established mass base, a well-knit organization in the
context of increasing state repression."3 5 It further challenged the labelling of
the Naxalite Movement as a terrorist adventure and instead opined that in the
circumstances, the kidnapping should be viewed as a "political act" which was
presenting a direct challenge to State authority. It however cautioned the State
and the mainstream media that "for the present it is necessary to stress that there
is need to use discretion in responding to acts such as this.""
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Responding to this note, Vasanta Kannabiran wrote a letter to the Editor
stating that "uneasy questions must be asked."" She took an exception to the
comment that the act of kidnapping be viewed as a political act and observed
that one could not afford to overlook the fact that after the commandoes had
arrived, the kidnapped IAS officers were told that no alternative was left but to
execute them, with there being a fifty percent chance of the settlement falling
through. She took equally strong exception to the comment that the incident
sent "the chill down the spine among the bourgeois liberals", instead arguing
that "this comment dismissed serious questions merely because it was liberal
or bourgeois ... [even though] there are countless democratic liberal supporters
of revolutionary movements and well meaning administrators like Sankaran
who [have been] labelled by the State as Naxalite."" Adding that the support
of such liberals, whether in terms of their intellectual inputs or their solid work
at bourgeois institutions, was invaluable to these revolutionary groups, Vasanta
Kannabiran further observed that "the problem many of us whose intellectual
commitment springs from the left is that we exist in an uncritical unholy wedlock
that does not permit us to raise genuine doubts and fears publicly ... there is all
pervading confusion between loyalty and commitment.""r
In a response to the above comment by Vasanta Kannabiran, K.G. Balagopal
in a note in the Economic and Political Weekly titled "To Judge, but How to Judge"
lamented about the virulent campaign which had been launched against the CPI

(ML) movement by the State and the "articulate public" 4 and had resulted in a
major sphere of their activity, being the politicization of the masses and their
organisation for struggle, being blacked out. Given that the acts of violence- given
and taken- were decked out in bright print, with a "discourse" being built around
them, he attempted "to set the terms of discourse right [by] restor[ing] all that the
paradigm has blacked out." He undertook this unenviable task by recounting the
surprise felt by some of the kidnapped IAS officers in East Godavari district with
respect to the level and detail of knowledge possessed by the Naxalites regarding
the problems of the tribals in each and every village and their excellent system of
communication, which stretched from the interior of the forest to the inhabited
37
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villages." He further added that "a truth that is unusually left unsaid in reporting
and discussing the acts of revolutionary groups is that the activists and leaders
who allegedly use the people are themselves from the people and are a part of
the people and they share the cost with their people."41 What was unique about
Balagopal's piece was his admission that it was in the nature of things that the
Naxalites would probably do more things wrong than right and that while they
had "the right and even the duty to criticize and question, but the framework of
the questioning must arise from fidelity to the same history and not from any of
the extraneous considerations that are determining the criticism today."42
Kancha Ilaiah, a civil rights activist, described the whole event as a "tactical
blunder" and took the opposing view by contending that the kidnapping signalled
a victory for the police, who had now gained an upper hand over the civilian
bureaucracy since even progressive IAS officers could not move without their
protection. "This is the case", he further argued,
'thatit was the gun which was controlling the Naxalpolitics and not the other way round
as, one would wonder why pro-poor IAS officerr who took on the State and had not
approved the police excesses were abducted. This has given a handle to the State to portray
the Naxals as terroritr. "'
Thus, his view was that while IAS Officers constituted a part of the State
which the Naxalites were fighting, they should have made a distinction between
officers concerned with the welfare of the poor and others, especially since the
former category provided relief to the poor people. Taking on Ilaiah's argument,
N. Venugopal, associated with the Revolutionary Writers Association, argued
that since police supremacy was already existent, the question of whether this
particular kidnap incident would further contribute to that process needed to be
questioned and re-examined. In fact:
'[a/s a class struggle deepens, it is but natural that the armed wing gets the upper hand.
And calling it a 'tactical blunder' is something which a sympathetic intellectual,passing
ajudgment without as thorough analysis as People0 War only could do by asserting that
kidnapping was a new form of protest.'
41
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Frontier in its editorial made the following pertinent remarks:
The daringdayliht abduction of seven (sic) LAS officia/s has thrown the tribalproblems
of Andhra Pradesh in bold relief .. and only the utterly complacent will be able to write
off this act of the People1 War as one of sheer outlawry. The kidnapping is situated in
the increasing and inhuman exploitation of the tribalr and the mounting terror tactics
adopted by the Government machiner which include the burning of entire tribal villages,
rape,pillage and punder as common occurrences. Therefore, there are somejustfications
in these acts and such counter-terror (of hostage exchanges) on the part of the Peope1
War was to an extent inevitable given the kind of arrests and massive 'encounterkillings'
that the government has been induging injor a considerableperiod of time... [After al
a movement committed to changing the socio-politicalstructure through armed struggle can
hardly afford to sit idle while its activists are butchered by ruthless state machinery.'
Furthermore, in its response to N.T. Rama Rao's remark that "let these so
called Naxalites come to me I will solve their problems" the Frontier observed that
the Naxalite Movement was one of the first which completely rejected the carrot
and stick policies pursued by the government and that its aim was to change the
society and transform the nature of Indian politics. However, it was felt that terror
and repression were not long term solutions, often becoming counter-productive
and that, while the exchange of prisoners and IAS officers succeeded this time,
thing would "never again be the same in India so far as outlawed are concerned."46
The foregoing detailed account aims to bring out the dilemmas and
complexities that occur in the course of advancement of militant political
movements. The movements promote different methods and forms of resistance
in their confrontation with a powerful state. Kidnapping, as admitted by the
Naxalite Movement itself, is yet another method of struggle. After the 1987 kidnap
incident in Gurtedu, there were a number of incidents of kidnapping; but the
next major incident was in the year 1993, of an IAS officer, one MLA and five
district level officers in Koyyur forest of Andhra Pradesh. This episode lasted for
more than three weeks, drawing a major public debate. In this hostage situation,
unlike the Gurtedu kidnap incident, it was the government of Andhra Pradesh that
sought the help of civil liberty leaders. The public debate raised several questions
45
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and the civil liberties leaders themselves questioned the relevance and desirability
of such a method. The then People's War Party at one stage decided not to
use the method and from 1993 onwards, there were no further incidents of
kidnapping. Thus, the kidnap of the district collector in Orissa in February 2011
came as a bit of a surprise. But this kidnap and the demands put forward were
of a different kind, unfolding the changing focus of the Maoist Movement and
response of the State.

III.

MALKANGIRI KIDNAP IN ORISSA

The Maoists' kidnap of district collector R. Vineel Krishna and junior
engineer Pabitra Mohan Majhi took place on February 16, 2011, in the state of
Orissa. 47
Orissa is one of the poorer states in India with very rich natural resources,
particularly water and minerals. It has some of the largest deposits of quality
bauxite, estimated to be worth more than two trillion dollars, nearly twice that
of India's GDP. In a very perceptive and insightful work "Out of this Earth",
Felix Padel and Samarendra Das brought out graphically the deepening crisis in
the tribal areas of Orissa. 48 The neo-liberal model of development that is out to
loot has been slapped on the area, and this is hitting hard the tribals who have
been living in the region for centuries. The MNCs are dangerously engaged in the
exploitation of natural resources in all corners of the globe and this has turned
out to be a "resource curse to the tribals of the region", who are being robbed
of their life and livelihood while the Earth is being ripped of its resources. It is
this brutal and naked exploitation of resources that has led to resistance from
the tribals, who do not want to just let their age-old cultures die any more. To
contextualise the problem, it can b;.e better understood that the "the trouble
is, they face huge repression by security forces and company mafias, and their
movements get confused in the popular imagination with the Maoist insurgency,
which is growing in the region because of people's outrage at the increasing
47
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repression and exploitation."49 Thus, if anything can save our Earth for us, it
is the uncompromising struggles of the Adivasi activists, who are continuously
protesting the exploitation of the eastern regions of India by a form of ruthless
capitalism, without heed to the costs."so
It is in this backdrop that the Malkangiri kidnap has to be analysed and
understood. The episode is sketched out below to present the developments that
followed the kidnap, which show the democratic space available for mediation
and peaceful resolution of issues, in an otherwise totally confrontationist volcanic
situation.
In the wake of this kidnap, the Maoist Party suggested three persons, R.S. Rao,
G. Haragopal (the author) and Dandapani Mohanty, whom the media prefer to call
"interlocutors", to mediate on a charter of demands. The "interlocutors" learnt
about the mediation through the media. Varavara Rao, a well-known revolutionary
poet informed all the three mediators about the Maoist choice and advised that
they partake in the mediation. The Orissa Government through its Home Secretary
conveyed its endorsement for mediation and the mediators. The discussion on
the demands between the three mediators and two government representatives
(U.N. Behra, Principal Secretary, Home and S. N. Tripathi, Secretary, Panchayati
Raj) commenced on February 20,2011. The Maoist Party nominated two leaders,
namely Sriramalu Srinivasulu and Ganti Prasadam in Korput jail for consultation
on behalf of the party. The Orissa Government for its own reasons agreed for
consultation with Ganti Prasadam and not Sriramulu Srinivasulu." In order to
not lose time in the procedural rigmarole, the Government of Orissa agreed to
the proposal of the mediators that Ganti Prasadam be shifted from Kioraput to
Bhubaneshwar jail for ready consultations.
When the mediators met Ganti Prasadam in Bhubaneshwar jail to discuss
the technicalities and difficulties in the charter of demands, he took a broad
democratic view and suggested that the release of the tribals languishing in the
49
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jails be prioritised over the other demands. He also felt that the demand for release
of the leaders as a top priority may not be democratic as the leaders and activists
can always voice their views and take recourse to legal battles while the voice of
the tribals, for whom their party was fighting, was not often heard or remained
unrepresented. On his own, in addition to the charter of demands, he suggested
that a judicial enquiry into all the encounter deaths could be put forth, not as a
demand but as his suggestion. This interaction consequently made the task of
the mediators and the process of mediation easier and smoother.
As the charter of demands was taken up, the government representatives
put them in an order that they felt was easy to deal with. The mediators chose to
not object to the ordering of the demands. On February 21, eight demands were
taken up; these includedfirst,declaring Nookadora and Konda Reddy communities
as Scheduled Tribes; secondly, stopping the Polavaram project; thirdy, issuance of
pattas to the tribals of Koraput, Malkangiri, Narayanapatnam and Vishakapatnam
areas;Jburthy, constructing a canal from Kotapalli to Maneguda; fifthl, paying
compensation to the families of Tadangi Gangulu and Ratanu Sirika who had
died due to torture in the jail; sixthly, releasing the Central Committee members
Sheela di and Padma due to their ill health;the final two demands related to the
cancellation of the mining leases and withdrawing the MOUs with various MNCs.
A mere perusal of the demands makes one realize that most of these
demands fell either in the domain of development or welfare, both of which the
State Government should be carrying on as its obligations to its own citizens.
The State representatives obviously did not have much difficulty in readily
conceding to four to five of their demands. They not only agreed to the demand
for recognizing Nookadora and Konda Reddy communities as Scheduled Tribes,
but also informed the mediators that they had already initiated steps by way of
consultation with the Orissa Tribal Advisory Council and had recommended the
Konda Reddy community to the Ministry of Tribal Welfare, Government of India,
for their inclusion in the list of Scheduled Tribes. They promised that similar steps
would also be taken up in the case of the Nookadora community, to pressurize
the central government for early consideration of this proposal. With regard to
the Polavaram project that would submerge villages in Orissa and Telangana,
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the Orissa Assembly had already unanimously passed a resolution opposing the
project and also filed a case against the project in the Supreme Court.
The third demand, about giving pattas to the tribals and restoring the land
from non-tribals, was not as simple to handle as the first two demands. However,
the government agreed to protect the land rights of the tribals, and further
agreed to constitute a high level committee under the chairmanship of a senior
officer (in the rank of Member, Board of Revenue) and post officers of the
rank of Additional

/

Joint Secretary with statutory powers under the land laws,
to expeditiously dispose the cases relating to land rights of the tribal persons.
With respect to the demand for the construction of a canal from Kotapally
to Maribada for providing irrigation facilities to Kalmela farmers, the government
promised to construct an aqueduct for extension of Kotapally Minor canal to
Maribada village, which would have the capacity to irrigate about 500 hectares
of additional land. Regarding the related issue of providing irrigation facilities
to the left out land of Manemkonda village, the State felt that it was not feasible
because of higher elevation and difficult topography, but promised that it would
take up a lift irrigation project on a priority basis.
The fifth demand related to the payment of compensation to the families
of Tadangi Gangulu and Ratanu Sirika, who died due to neglect of health care
and torture by the Koraput jail authorities. The government stated that they had
died while under treatment in the hospital, andnot due to torture in jail. Since
a writ petition had already been filed in the High Court by the family members,
the State agreed to abide by whatever order the Hon'ble High Court passed.5 2
The sixth demand was about the ill health of Shaeela di and Padma. In the
course of discussion it was learnt that they were not in Orissa jails. However, it
was promised that the Orissa Government would write to the Chhattisgarh and
Jharkhand State Governments, where these two were detained, and request the
respective Governments to take care of their health.
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Now the Orissa Tigh Court has given a reasonably favourable judgment ordering the Orissa
government to pay a compensation of Rs. 3.5 lakh to the victims. The Orissa government,
hopefully, will abide by the judgment.
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The seventh and eighth demands taken up on the first day were difficult
to negotiate. These related to the cancellation of mining leases and withdrawal
of MOUs with various MNCs. This concerned the very "development model"
that the State Government was committed to. As a response to this demand,
the government promised to abide by all the relevant laws and rules such as the
Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, Forest Conservation Act,
Forest Rights Act and various environment laws, in lieu of scrapping of the leases
and MOUs. It also promised that the displacement of tribals would be confined
to the minimum and adequate compensation and proper rehabilitation would be
ensured to the affected persons. As the mediators were unsure about how far this
demand could be stretched, it was thought that the response of the government
under the given conditions was tolerable enough. This issue was taken up for a
serious discussion when the mediators met the Chief Minister on February 25.
This particular demand (regarding the cancellation of mining leases and
withdrawal of MOUs) has something to do with the political and ideological
position of the State and the brutal path of development that the Indian ruling
classes have come to pursue during the last two to three decades. Almost all the
political parties, irrespective of their allegiance to caste (including the oppressed
castes), creed, colour, religion, region, sub-region or proclaimed ideologies, have
hammered out a consensus on the model of development. There is no single
political party (except the left parties) openly opposed to the model as a part of
its opportunistic politics. With the Singur and Nandigram episodes however, the
CPM party also lost its credibility. The major failure of the left parties was that they
did not mobilise the masses against the developmental model. It appears that the
political character of the elite either remained comprador or got denationalized
in the course of time. Thus, the Maoists, located as they are outside the entire
parliamentary politics system, seem to be a political force to reckon with in the
light of their opposition of the development and corporate-profits model. In that
sense, this demand for cancellation of MOUs signifies their politics, but goes
beyond such negotiations.
The other six demands were taken up on February 22, 2011. Some of
these demands were complex but had serious political import. The easier to
handle demands were payment of compensation to the farmers of cut off and
13'
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submerged areas of Balimela reservoir and providing alternative facilities to the
project affected persons, as also providing justice to the displaced persons of
NALCO project in Damanjodi (demands ten and eleven). The difficult case was
that of the disappearance of Sitanna and the demand to indicate his whereabouts
(demand nine). The other three demands (twelve, thirteen and fourteen) were
critical in the negotiations and much depended on the outcome of mediation on
these demands. These were as follows: stopping Operation Green Hunt, releasing
Central Committee members and others and withdrawal of the cases against the
tribals and Chasi Mulia workers in Koraput and Malkangiri Jails.
The governmental response to the demand for payment of compensation
to the farmers of cut off and submerged areas of Balimela reservoir was that no
complaints had been received from the affected persons. They promised that
they would inquire into the matter and take action as per the prevailing guidelines.
With regard to the alternative facilities to be provided in view of the possibility of
submergence, the government held that there was no proposal to raise the height
of the dam and there need not be any apprehensions of further submergence of
the villagers. Similarly, regarding the demand for justice for the NALCO project
affected persons, they held that there were no grievances reported, but if any
grievance was brought to notice, the government would redress it.
In the case of disappearance of Sitanna, a tribal, the government not only
flatly denied the incident, but further said that Sitanna was very much alive and
was in a hideout as he was afraid of the Maoist Party which he had chosen to
desert. They asserted that he was in constant touch with his wife and family
members." They agreed to order an administrative inquiry to investigate further
into this matter. On the crucial demand of stopping Green Hunt operations, the
government agreed not to take recourse to coercive action as long as the Maoists
did not indulge in any unlawful activities. When the mediators suggested the
initiation of peace talks on the lines of the Andhra experiment, they government
did not seem enthusiastic.
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Sitanna's wife filed a habeas corpus petition which the court did not admit. The fact of the
matter seems to be that Sitanna was picked up by the BSF, and ever since his whereabouts
are not known. In all possibility he might have been killed.
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With respect to withdrawing the cases against the tribals (demand thirteen),
the Orissa government stated that it had taken suo moto action for withdrawal of
minor cases and in the past, 9,013 of such cases had been dropped. In keeping
with this precedent, the State agreed to initiate the process within fifteen days,
review the cases against tribals held on charges of Maoist activities and land related
disputes in Narayanapatna area, and complete the whole process of release within
three months. They agreed to the suggestion of the mediators that Professor
Radha Mohan, a well-respected Gandhian and Sudhakar Patnaik, a senior journalist
from Orissa would oversee the process of review and release of the tribals.
The last but most important demand (fourteen) was the release of Central
Committee member Ashutosh Sen and other members, Sriramalu Sreenivasulu,
Gana Nayak, Jeevan Bose, Ganti Prasadam, Sirisha, Eshwari, Sarita and Gokul
(the truck driver). In the mediation, as the other cases were far more complicated,
the list was confined to Sriramulu Srinivasulu, Ganti Prasadam, Sirisha, Eshwari,
Sarita, and Gokul (the last five being part of Similiguda P. S. Case No. 78). The
Similiguda case was onewhere the three women and the truck driver were arrested
when they were entering the forest to meet members of the Maoist Party. Sirisha,
alias Padma, was to meet RK (her spouse) who was the party secretary. The charge
against Ganti Prasadam was that he facilitated their going into the forest. The
mediators argued that this was no serious offence as the attempt to meet family
members was not a crime in itself In response, the government agreed to take
steps for withdrawal of the case and all the five implicated in the case would be
released soon. In the negotiations on this issue, the Government of Orissa initially
was favourably inclined to withdraw the cases against Sriramalu Sreenivasulu, but
backtracked on this promise later.
As this agreement was finalised, keeping in view all the logistics, the mediators
appealed to the Maoist Party through a press conference held on the evening of
February 22 for the release of Vineel IKrishna, the district collector and Pabitra
Majhi, the junior engineer in forty eight hours. This appeal did not reach the
Maoist Party as the print and electronic media had no reach to the remote hilly
tribal tracks. In the meanwhile, the Maoists released the junior engineer and sent a
message with him that the mediators should personally go to a venue suggested by
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them along with the freed Maoist leaders and other members when the collector
will be freed; they also suggested the presence of Swami Agnivesh. Puzzled by
this unexpected development, the mediators took exception to the adding of new
demands and sought the advice and help of Varavara Rao and Ganti Prasadam.
Both of them agreed that given the distance and other complications, it was not
feasible at that stage. This was conveyed to the Maoists through All India Radio
and BBC; this message also reached them after twelve hours. It should, however,
be noted that the Maoists expedited the release of the collector to keep their word
to the mediators, and handed over the collector to media persons and local tribals
two hours ahead of the set deadline.
The role of the media, both print and electronic, calls for deeper but separate
analysis. The credibility and reliability of the entire national and regional electronic
media was deeply eroded as telecasts concerning information that the district
collector and the junior engineer were released, and that the district collector had
reached his residence, started being relayed on the evening of February 22. The
media started interrogating the mediators on the news that they had engendered
on their own and would not care to listen that the forty eight hour deadline had
been set after considerable deliberation. In their competition for sensationalism
and 'first to announce' obsession, each channel committed the same blunder. The
mediators, including the author, had to repeatedly clarify that the information
was not correct. The next morning, some of the electronic media channels
apologized to the viewers. During the whole episode, the media did not conduct
itself with self-respect and dignity, nor was it committed to transmitting reliable
information to build public opinion for peaceful resolution of a crisis. This
approach of the media has serious implications to the making and working of
the liberal framework of Indian democracy and promoting public reasoning and
informed debate on sensitive issues.
The three month period for taking action on the demands by the government
lapsed on May 24,2011. There were questions from different quarters as to what
happened to the agreement. When contacted, the authorities sounded agreeable
to enforcing the agreement.54 The mediators had to address a letter to Naveen
54

For instance, the government after some pressure called Prof. Radha Mohan and Sudhakar
Patnaik and completed the formality of a meeting; neither was the government willing to
give them the details about the tribals in prisons, nor allowing them any access to the prisons
or prisoners. When insisted upon, the government took a position that these visits did not
form a part of the agreement.
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Patnaik, the Chief Minister, reminding him of the commitment he gave to the
mediators on February 25, 2011; the letter stressed that "non-implementation of
the agreement would erode the confidence of the people in peaceful resolution
of crisis which in turn adversely affects the credibility and legitimacy of the State
power."
In the meanwhile, the ceasefire agreement" was violated. Both the parties
blamed each other. A list of violations by the government, brought to the notice
of the mediators, was enclosed in a letter to the Chief Minister." There was a long
list of violations by the security forces during the last three months, vitiating the
overall atmosphere. There was also loss of human life. The Orissa Government
could have taken advantage of the opportunity to initiate peace talks on the lines
that the government of Andhra Pradesh took, to avoid the loss of human life
on either side."
On May 24, after the lapse of the three month deadline, the mediators
along with Varavara Rao, Prof. Radha Mohan and Sudhakar Patnaik met the
Chief Minister and had a discussion on the fourteen point agreement. The Chief
Secretary and the Home Secretary recounted the steps that they had initiated or
proposed to take. This time, to be more specific, the mediators prioritised four
issues: one, respect of the peace agreement; two, the release of Ganti Prasadam
and others; three, the release of the six hundred tribals; andfour, protection of
the land rights of the tribals. It was also suggested to bring in a tribal land rights
legislation on the lines of 1/70 Act of Andhra Pradesh. In fact, in the first
meeting on February 25, the devastation that the neo-liberal model had been
causing was highlighted by the mediators. It was also pleaded that the Orissa
55
56

57

It must be noted that the Orissa government is not comfortable with this expression.
This list included an incident of the killing of Lalit Kumar Dehuri, who was under police
custody at the time of mediation. His detention along with four other persons was brought
to the notice of the Home Secretary, who did not pay serious attention to the issue. The
life of this young man could not be saved.
In fact, the idea of peace talks had been in the air as the Central Home Minister at least
vaguely mentioned about it here and there. The Maoist Party seems to be favourably inclined
for peace tasks in West Bengal after the recent elections. There was such an initiative at an
all India level by the democratic minded and peace loving individuals drawn from different
walks of national life. At the national level, the prospect of peace talks is evasive, but awaited.
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government should shift the development paradigm, and take tribals and their
progress as the touchstone of any development. These concerns were reiterated
in this meeting as well.
The Chief Minister who sat all through the discussion lasting for two hours
promised that Ganti Prasadam and four others would be released in two weeks
time and the release of at least 169 tribals detained in land related and Maoist
cases would be completed by the end of June. With regard to protecting the land
rights of the tribals, they would abide by their promise to constitute a high power
committee and complete the process in six months. With respect to violations
of the peace agreement, the government came out with an equally long list of
violations by the Maoist Party. The mediators expressed their readiness to appeal
to the Maoists to exercise restraint from their side; the chances of peace, of
course, do depend on both the sides observing restraint. During the peace talks
in Andhra Pradesh, both the sides -the Maoists and the government- observed
remarkable restraint and there was no loss of human life for about ten months.
That it did not last is a different story; the Rajashekhara Reddy government
derailed the process for its own reasons.
IV. IN RETROSPECT
The striking difference between the 1987 kidnap and the 2011 kidnap
is the changing approach of the Indian State and the Maoist Movement.
In the first kidnap, it was the exchange of the party members for the
kidnapped officers; in contrast, in the Orissa kidnap, there was a charter
of demands. In the 1987 kidnap, the intervention of the members of civil
liberties organisations was on the request of the hostages, whereas in the
1993 kidnap, it was on the request of the government. In 2011 and 2012,
it was the Maoists who asked for the intervention of members of civil liberties
organizations. This change can be partly attributed to the 2004 peace talks in
Andhra Pradesh between the State and the Maoist Movement. Many lessons can
be drawn from this experience of peace negotiations in the two and a half decades.
Having witnessed the way the Rajashekhara Reddy government went back on
the peace agreement, the way the Home Minister Chidambaram broke his word
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to Swami Agnivesh, the manner in which the Maoist leader Cherukuri Rajkumar
alias Azad, engaged in finalising the process of peace talks, was killed and the
way the agreement in Orissa was treated, the peace initiative does not seem to
hold much promise at this point of time; yet the historical possibility of such an
experiment persists.
Kidnap as a method of resistance has multiple facets, which require a separate
and detailed analysis. This kidnap was able to throw up a debate on the concerns
of Maoists and their approach to the development model. The media in the
country has been debating and propagating their methods of resistance more,
and not their politics. The State, in the process of containing or countering the
movement, is becoming increasingly repressive and lawless in its behaviour; it is this
lawlessness of the State that makes the people not totally disapprove of methods
like kidnap. A responsive and law abiding culture on the part of the State in dealing
with the deprivation of the rights of tribals and their resistance would have had
a far reaching positive impact, as compared to responding to such contingencies
and not abiding by its own commitments. The Maoist Party should also rethink
this method as it cripples the sympathetic civil servants working for the people
and the police force starts invading the space legitimately belonging to the civil
bureaucracy. This has the danger of causing further brutalization by the state.
The kidnappings and consequent developments raise larger questions, the
most basic of which relates to the implications of this method in settling the
political issues. This assumes great importance against the backdrop of decline
in the quality of governance and the overall erosion of legitimacy of state power.
The representative democracy in India has turned into a formalistic arrangement;
it does not reach out to the grassroots. As a result there are a range of movements
outside the formal structure, pressurizing the system to deliver. The entire
debate and fight against corruption is a part of this syndrome. This is a fallout
of the model of development which is driven by global economic interests; it
leaves no space for consultation with the masses or people's participation. Any
resistance against the model in any form is sought to be put down, even through
unlawful, anti-social forces all over India, particularly in the hotspots of political
confrontation. Kidnapping, in this process, has come to be used as a method for
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settlement of political issues. The political potential of this method is limited
as it lacks the requisite political capacity to alter the terms and condition of the
development model. The charter of demands in the case of the Malkangiri kidnap
has something to do with the faulty model, but a kidnap in no way makes the rulers
reconsider or re-examine the path of development as their interests get entangled
with global interests and not the future of the Indian masses. Kidnapping can
at best be a part of the politics of contingency, but cannot be a catalyst in the
politics of transformation.
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